Corroboration

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 SETAKO Ephrem
(ICTR-04-81-A)

31. The Appeals Chamber will consider these challenges in turn. At the outset, it recalls that it is within the discretion of a trial chamber to evaluate inconsistencies in the evidence, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence.[1] The Appeals Chamber will defer to a trial chamber’s judgement on issues of credibility, including its resolution of disparities among different witnesses’ accounts, and will only find an error of fact if it determines that no reasonable trier of fact could have made the impugned finding.[2] Furthermore, corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.[3]

48. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber may rely on part of a witness’s testimony and reject other parts.[4] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber only relied on Witness SLA’s testimony where corroborated.[5] The Trial Chamber was therefore entitled to disregard Witness SLA’s claim of torture and still rely on his evidence with respect to the 25 April and 11 May Killings.

154. Regarding Setako’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in its reasoning, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the task of weighing and assessing evidence lies primarily with the trier of fact.[6] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber must give a margin of deference to a finding of fact reached by a trial chamber.[7] It will only interfere where no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same finding or where the finding is wholly erroneous.[8]

222. Setako’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred in dismissing his evidence for lack of corroboration due to contradictions in the testimonies of Witnesses SLA and SAT is unclear. If Setako claims that the Trial Chamber was compelled to accept his testimony because Witnesses SLA’s and SAT’s testimonies deviated from each other, the Appeals Chamber disagrees. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to decide on the weight, if any, to accord to a piece of evidence, regardless of whether or not that evidence is corroborated.[9] This discretion is not affected by purported inconsistencies in other evidence.

[1] Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

[2] See supra, para. 10. See also Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 70.

[3] Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[4] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 201.

[5] See Trial Judgement, para. 367.

[6] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 18. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 14.

[7] Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, paras. 9, 186; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 10; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 14.

[8] Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 9; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 10; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, paras. 13, 14.

[9] See Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 72; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 101.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 MUNYAKAZI Yussuf
(ICTR-97-36A-A)

71. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies.[1] It is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate any such inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence.[2] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.”[3]

103. […] Furthermore, corroboration does not require witnesses’ accounts to be identical in all aspects since “[e]very witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others.” Rather, the main question is whether two or more credible accounts are incompatible.

118. […] The Appeals Chamber recalls that, when faced with competing versions of events, it is the duty of the Trial Chamber that heard the witnesses to determine which evidence it considers more probative. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to accept the Prosecution evidence over Witness Nahimana’s account.

154. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within or among witnesses’ testimonies. […]

110. Finally, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber has the primary discretion to decide whether or not a site visit is necessary or relevant for the assessment of evidence. […]

[1] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

[2] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 355; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

[3] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. See also Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173.

[4] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[5] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[6] Muvunyi II Appeal Judgement, para. 57; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 29.

[7] Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 269; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 207; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 103.

[8] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 16.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 19.07.2010 HARADINAJ et al.
(IT-04-84-A)

145. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber may enter a conviction on the “basis of a single witness, although such evidence must be assessed with the appropriate caution, and care must be taken to guard against the exercise of an underlying motive on the part of the witness.”[1] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “a Trial Chamber should at least briefly explain why it accepted the evidence of witnesses who may have had motives or incentives to implicate the accused; in this way, a Trial Chamber shows its cautious assessment of this evidence.”[2] [see also para. 242 of the Appeals Judgement]

219. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber is at liberty to rely on the evidence of a single witness when making its findings.[3] The testimony of a single witness may be accepted without the need for corroboration, even if it relates to a material fact.[4] […]

[1] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 274.

[2] Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 146.

[3] Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

[4] Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 492, 506; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 154.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 15.07.1999 TADIĆ Duško
(IT-94-1-A)

65. The Appeals Chamber notes that it has been the practice of this Tribunal and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)[1] to accept as evidence the testimony of a single witness on a material fact without need for corroboration. […]  

[1] More fully, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.12.2013 NDAHIMANA Grégoire
(ICTR-01-68-A)

45. The Appeals Chamber also rejects Ndahimana’s contention that as a matter of law witnesses who require corroboration cannot corroborate one another.[1] In the Appeals Chamber’s view, a finding that a witness’s evidence is not sufficiently credible or reliable to be relied upon on its own, and therefore needs corroboration, does not amount to a finding that the witness cannot be relied upon at all, but merely denotes the adoption of a cautious approach by the trial chamber in its evidentiary assessment of the evidence. Absent any contrary finding, a trial chamber’s decision to ultimately rely upon the cumulative evidence of witnesses whose evidence required corroboration reflects the trial chamber’s determination that, taken as whole, the evidence was sufficiently credible and reliable. This factual determination is an exercise of the trial chamber’s discretionary power in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in determining the weight to be accorded to their evidence in which the Appeals Chamber will only interfere where no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same finding or where the finding is wholly erroneous.[2]  

[1] The Appeals Chamber observes that, in support of this contention, Ndahimana cites a single case from India, which, according to him, stands for the proposition that “the evidence is not sufficient to constitute corroboration if it is such as itself requires corroboration.” See Ndahimana Appeal Brief [Appellant’s Brief, 12 December 2012], para. 51, fn. 234, citing Vaijanath v. State, 1970 Cri. L.J.91 (Vol. 76, paragraph 29). See also Ndahimana Reply Brief [Appellant’s Brief in Reply, 5 February 2013], para. 77, fn. 64.

[2] See supra [Ndahimana Appeal Judgement], para. 10.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014 NIZEYIMANA Ildéphonse
(ICTR-00-55C-A)

Fn. 784. The Appeals Chamber recalls that in other cases it has affirmed the use of background evidence as circumstantial corroboration of an otherwise credible witness’s testimony. See, e.g., Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, paras. 255, 257.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 NTAWUKULILYAYO Dominique
(ICTR-05-82-A)

21. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber has full discretion to assess the appropriate credibility and weight to be accorded to the testimony of a witness;[1] corroboration is one of many potential factors relevant to this assessment.[2] A Trial Chamber retains discretion to decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether corroboration of evidence is necessary and to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony.[3]

[…]

24. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber recalls that two prima facie credible testimonies need not be identical in all aspects or describe the same fact in the same way in order to be corroborative.[4] Every witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others.[5] It follows that corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.[6]

[1] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47; Muvunyi Appeal Judgement of 1 April 2011, para. 56; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 194.

[2] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 24, quoting Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 132.

[3] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 45. See also Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 556; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Muvunyi Appeal Judgement of 29 August 2008, para. 128.

[4] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[5] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Karera Appeal Judgement, paras. 173, 192.

[6] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 71, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010 RUKUNDO Emmanuel
(ICTR-2001-70-A)

76. The Appeals Chamber recalls its holding in the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement that:

two testimonies corroborate one another when one prima facie credible testimony is compatible with the other prima facie credible testimony regarding the same fact or a sequence of linked facts. It is not necessary that both testimonies be identical in all aspects or describe the same fact in the same way. Every witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others. It follows that corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.[1] See also para. 201.

[1] Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. See also Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 24.03.2000 ALEKSOVSKI Zlatko
(IT-95-14/1-A)

62. Neither the Statute nor the Rules oblige a Trial Chamber to require medical reports or other scientific evidence as proof of a material fact.  Similarly, the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not require, as a matter of law, any corroboration.  The only Rule directly relevant to the issue at hand is Rule 89.  In particular, sub-Rule 89(C) states that a Chamber “may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value”, and sub-Rule 89(D) states that a Chamber “may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial”. 

Download full document
ICTR Rule Rule 89(C)
Rule 89(D)
ICTY Rule Rule 89(C)
Rule 89(D)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 24.03.2000 ALEKSOVSKI Zlatko
(IT-95-14/1-A)

63. Trial Chambers are best placed to hear, assess and weigh the evidence, including witness testimonies, presented at trial.  Whether a Trial Chamber will rely on single witness testimony as proof of a material fact, will depend on various factors that have to be assessed in the circumstances of each case.[1]  In a similar vein, it is for a Trial Chamber to consider whether a witness is reliable and whether evidence presented is credible.  The Appeals Chamber, therefore, has to give a margin of deference to the Trial Chamber’s evaluation of the evidence presented at trial.  The Appeals Chamber may overturn the Trial Chamber’s finding of fact only where the evidence relied on could not have been accepted by any reasonable tribunal[2] or where the evaluation of the evidence is wholly erroneous.

[1] Tadi} Judgement, para. 65.

[2] Ibid.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 03.07.2002 BAGILISHEMA Ignace
(ICTR-95-IA-A)

79. […] [I]t is well settled that “the testimony of a single witness on a material fact may be accepted as evidence without the need for corroboration.”[1] However, the Appeals Chamber considers that this jurisprudence cannot be interpreted to mean that a Trial Chamber cannot resort to corroboration; the Trial Chamber can do so by virtue of its discretion. […]

[1] Kayishema/Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 154, citing the Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65, the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62 and the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 492 and 506.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 12.11.2009 MILOŠEVIĆ Dragomir
(IT-98-29/1-A)

215. […] [N]othing prohibits a Trial Chamber from relying on uncorroborated evidence; it has the discretion to decide in the circumstances of each case whether corroboration is necessary or whether to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony.[1]

248. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does not establish automatically the credibility, reliability or weight of those testimonies” and that it is “neither a condition nor a guarantee of reliability of a single piece of evidence”.[2] However, given that the assessment of evidence, including corroboration, is a matter of the Trial Chamber’s discretion, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that Milošević has shown that in the circumstances of the case, the Trial Chamber abused its discretion in rejecting witnesses Knowles and Hansen’s evidence while relying on the evidence supporting the Prosecution’s case.

[1] See, e.g., Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 63; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras 49, 101, 120, 159 and 207; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 633 and 810; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 72; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 170, citing Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Rutaganda Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 36. See also infra, Section X.B.2, para. 248.

[2] Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 203, referring, inter alia, to Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 62-63; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 492, 506; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 72; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras 37-38; See also Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 45.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2001 MUSEMA Alfred
(ICTR-96-13-A)

36.     One of the duties of a Trial Chamber is to assess the credibility of witnesses.  In discharging that duty, the Trial Chamber takes into account all the circumstances of the case.  As stated in the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, “[w]hether a Trial Chamber will rely on single witness testimony as proof of a material fact, will depend on various factors that have to be assessed in the circumstances of each case.”[1]  It may be that a Trial Chamber would require the testimony of a witness to be corroborated, but according to the established practice of this Tribunal and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), that is clearly not a requirement.[2]

37.     In the instant case, the Trial Chamber affirmed that it “may rule on the basis of a single testimony if, in its opinion, that testimony is relevant and credible.”[3] It further stated that:

[…] it is proper to infer that the ability of the Chamber to rule on the basis of testimonies and other evidence is not bound by any rule of corroboration, but rather on the Chamber’s own assessment of the probative value of the evidence before it.

The Chamber may freely assess the relevance and credibility of all evidence presented to it. The Chamber notes that this freedom to assess evidence extends even to those testimonies which are corroborated: the corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does not establish absolutely the credibility of those testimonies.[4]

38.     The Appeals Chamber is of the view that these statements correctly reflect the position of the law regarding the Trial Chamber’s discretion in assessing testimonies and the evidence before it.

[1] Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 63, referring to Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65.

[2] Kayishema/Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras. 154 and 229; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62 (“the testimony of a single witness does not require as a matter of law any corroboration”); Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 492 and 506.

[3] Trial Judgement [Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, 27 January 2000], para. 43.

[4] Ibid. [Trial Judgement], paras. 45 to 46.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 23.10.2001 KUPREŠKIĆ et al.
(IT-95-16-A)

220.    The Prosecution is correct in maintaining that “the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not require, as a matter of law, any corroboration”.[1]  Rather, the absence of corroboration is simply one factor to be taken into consideration by the Trial Chamber in weighing the evidence and arriving at its determination of witness credibility.  Certainly, in cases hinging on a single witness’ identification of the accused made in difficult circumstances, corroborative evidence takes on more importance.[2]  However, of itself, the absence of corroboration is not a ground for the Appeals Chamber to intervene in a factual finding made by the Trial Chamber.

[1] Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62.  See the further discussion supra para. 33.

[2] See the discussion supra paras 34-36.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 27.09.2007 LIMAJ et al.
(IT-03-66-A)

203. […] Moreover, corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does not establish automatically the credibility, reliability or weight of those testimonies.[1] Corroboration is neither a condition nor a guarantee of reliability of a single piece of evidence.[2] It is an element that a reasonable trier of fact may consider in assessing the evidence. However, the question of whether to consider corroboration or not forms part of its discretion.

[1] See Musema Trial Judgement, para. 46, confirmed by Musema Appeal Judgement, paras 37-38; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, para. 40.

[2] See Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 62-63, with reference to Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 492 and 506; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 72; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 153; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras 154 and 229.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

375.[…].The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has a broad discretion to assess the appropriate weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony of a witness,[1] and is at liberty to rely on the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness when making its findings, even if it is related to a material fact.[2] […]

[1] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 86.

[2] Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 219; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 33; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 09.10.2012 GATETE Jean Baptiste
(ICTR-00-61-A)

125. The Appeals Chamber recalls that two testimonies corroborate one another when one prima facie credible testimony is compatible with the other prima facie credible testimony regarding the same fact or a sequence of linked facts. It is not necessary that both testimonies be identical in all aspects or describe the same fact in the same way.

126. The Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to find thematic consistencies between the accounts of Witnesses BBP, BVS, and BBJ, “in particular, that Gatete came to the parish prior to 11 April, spoke to gendarmes, who witnesses recalled had guarded the parish, and also spoke to the two priests at the parish.”[3] The Appeals Chamber is of the view that it was not necessary that all witnesses described the same visit by Gatete and corroborated each other in this respect for the Trial Chamber to find that Gatete had come to the parish prior to 11 April 1994. That the witnesses may have described different visits does not undermine the conclusion that their accounts were compatible on the fact that Gatete was seen at the parish before 11 April 1994.

205. […T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that two prima facie credible testimonies need not be identical in all aspects or describe the same fact in the same way in order to be corroborative.Every witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others. It follows that corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.

[1] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, paras. 177, 220; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 121, citing Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[2] Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgement, para. 220; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 24, citing Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428. See also Ntabakuze Appeal Judgement, para. 150.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 298.

[4] See supra, para. 125.

[5] Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 24, referring to Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 173; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[6] Hategekimana Appeal Judgement, para. 82; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgement, para. 24, referring to, inter alia, Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 71; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 NTAWUKULILYAYO Dominique
(ICTR-05-82-A)

21. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a Trial Chamber has full discretion to assess the appropriate credibility and weight to be accorded to the testimony of a witness;[1] corroboration is one of many potential factors relevant to this assessment.[2] A Trial Chamber retains discretion to decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether corroboration of evidence is necessary and to rely on uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, witness testimony.[3]

[…]

24. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber recalls that two prima facie credible testimonies need not be identical in all aspects or describe the same fact in the same way in order to be corroborative.[4] Every witness presents what he has seen from his own point of view at the time of the events, or according to how he understood the events recounted by others.[5] It follows that corroboration may exist even when some details differ between testimonies, provided that no credible testimony describes the facts in question in a way which is not compatible with the description given in another credible testimony.[6]

[1] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47; Muvunyi Appeal Judgement of 1 April 2011, para. 56; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 194.

[2] Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 47; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 24, quoting Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 132.

[3] Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 45. See also Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 556; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Muvunyi Appeal Judgement of 29 August 2008, para. 128.

[4] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428.

[5] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 103, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81; Karera Appeal Judgement, paras. 173, 192.

[6] Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, para. 71, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 428; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 201; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 81.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2001 KAYISHEMA & RUZINDANA
(ICTR-95-1-A)

154.    […] [T]he Appeals Chamber concurs with the opinion of ICTY Appeals Chamber that the testimony of a witness on a material fact may be accepted as evidence without the need for corroboration.[1]

[…]

322.    The Appeals Chamber reiterates[2] that accepting as evidence the uncorroborated testimony of a witness does not in itself constitute an error.[3]

See also para. 187.

[1] Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65, Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 62, and Čelebiči Appeal Judgement, paras 492 and 506.

[2] Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 65 in fine.

[3] Reference to Ruzindana’s allegation in his Brief, para. 42 (witness FF-Bisesero Hill ) and paras. 55 and 56 (witness KK and MM- Gitwa cellule).

Download full document