Right to be properly informed of reasons for arrest
|Appeal Judgement - 23.05.2005||
226. […] Although the Appellant was lawfully apprehended pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules, the manner in which the arrest was carried out was not according to due process of law because the Appellant was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. As held by the Appeals Chamber in Semanza, a suspect arrested at the behest of the Tribunal has a right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his or her arrest, and this right comes into effect from the moment of arrest and detention. Before providing the reasons for this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber first notes that in making an urgent Rule 40 request, the Prosecution is not required to provide the suspect with a copy of a warrant for the arrest. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds that in this case, the Appellant’s right to freedom from an arrest contrary to due process of law was not violated due to the lack of an arrest warrant by the Prosecution or the Benin authorities, given the exigencies of the circumstances in which he was arrested. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber does not agree with the Trial Chamber that the Prosecution was not required to have evidence tending to show that the Appellant may have committed crimes within this Tribunal’s jurisdiction at the time it made its Rule 40 request to the Benin authorities. By making a Rule 40 request for the urgent arrest of a suspect, the Prosecution is, by definition under Rule 2 of the Rules, making the claim that it possesses “reliable information which tends to show that he may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.” Indeed, in this case, the Prosecution represented in its request letter of 6 June 1998 to the Benin authorities only that it had “compelling and consistent evidence of [the Appellant’s] participation in crimes committed in the Republic of Rwanda between 1st January and 31st December 1994.”
251. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber concludes that […] the Appellant’s right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest at the time of his arrest as required under Article 9(2) of the ICCPR was not properly ensured.
 Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, para. 78.
 See Semanza, Decision, 31 May 2000, n. 106 citing Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999.
 Appeal Hearing, T. 7 March 2005 p. 51.
|ICTR Rule Rule 40 ICTY Rule Rule 40 Other instruments International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 9(2)|
|Decision - 01.06.2000||
2. The right of the suspect to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges against him
78. The Appeals Chamber holds that a suspect arrested by the Tribunal has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his or her arrest. In accordance with the norms of international human rights law, the Appeals Chamber has also accepted that this right comes into effect from the moment of arrest and detention.
 In its consideration of subsections D 2 to D 5 of Part V of this Decision, the Appeals Chamber takes note of the distinction made in the Barayagwiza Decision of 3 November 1999 regarding the Appellant’s status. Under Rule 2, he remains a "suspect" until an indictment against him is confirmed; thereafter he becomes an "accused". The relevance of such a distinction stems from the fact that guaranteed individual rights, in particular as to the permissible length of pre-trial detention, vary depending on the status of the individual concerned (Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, "Decision", Appeals Chamber, 3 November 1999, para. 41).
 The Chamber came to an identical conclusion in the Barayagwiza case (ibid., paras. 79-80). Specifically, the right of an arrested individual to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges against him is respected if the indictment against him is served upon him in rapid order. The right to be charged promptly by means of an indictment, as provided for under Article 20 (4) (a) of the Statute, must nevertheless be distinguished from the right to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges on account of which the arrested individual is deprived of his liberty. Confirmation and service of the indictment may follow some time after arrest. However, the individual must be informed in substance of the nature of the charges against him at the time of his arrest or shortly thereafter.
 See, in particular, Article 9 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 5 (2)of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Article 7 (4) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
 Op. cit. footnote 103, paras. 81-82. As the Appeals Chamber stresses in these paragraphs of the Barayagwiza Decision, there is no requirement for the Tribunal to provide the suspect with a copy of the arrest warrant or any other document setting forth the charges against him during this initial phase of detention. This right only guarantees the arrested suspect that he will be informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty.
|ICTR Rule Rule 40 bis|
|Decision - 03.11.1999||
Download full document
See paragraphs 79-82, 85 of the decision.
See also paragraphs 83-84 of the decision.
Disclaimer: No Word version of the present decision is currently available. It has therefore not been possible to include the text of the decision. Instead, the reader is directed to the relevant paragraphs of the decision.
Rule 40 bis
Rule 40 bis
Article 9(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Article 5(2) European Convention on Human Rights;
Article 7(4) American Convention on Human Rights
|Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014||
KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE
61. A suspect arrested by the Tribunal has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his or her arrest. In the Semanza case, the Appeals Chamber concluded that a reference to the accused being provisionally detained “for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” adequately described the substance of the charges to satisfy the requirement of notice at that stage. […]
 Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, 31 May 2000 (“Semanza Appeal Decision”), para. 78 and fns. 104, 106. An English translation was filed on 4 July 2001.
 Semanza Appeal Decision, paras. 83-85.
|Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015||
NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
42. As regards Nyiramasuhuko’s request for an appropriate remedy for the violations found at trial, the Appeals Chamber observes that the only violations determined to have occurred were the violations of her rights to be informed of the charges against her and of initial appearance without delay recognised in the 12 October 2000 Decision [The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized, 12 October 2000 (originally filed in French, English translation filed on the same day)]. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “any violation, even if it entails a relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate remedy”. The nature and form of the effective remedy should be proportional to the gravity of harm that is suffered. In practice, “the effective remedy accorded by a Chamber for violations of an accused’s fair trial rights will almost always take the form of equitable or declaratory relief.” The Appeals Chamber considers that, in situations where the violation has not materially prejudiced the accused, a formal recognition of the violation may be considered an effective remedy. Nyiramasuhuko has not developed any argument to demonstrate that the recognition of the violations of her rights to be informed of the charges against her and of initial appearance without delay by Judge Kama in the 12 October 2000 Decision was not an effective remedy. Nyiramasuhuko’s claim is therefore dismissed.
See also para. 50.
 See Nyiramasuhuko Appeal Brief, para. 71 (p. 21). The Appeals Chamber notes that Nyiramasuhuko has failed to identify in her submissions any other violation recognised by the Trial Chamber that may require remedy and will therefore limit its consideration to the violations of her rights to be informed of the charges against her and of initial appearance without delay, which are expressly discussed in her submissions under this ground of appeal.
 André Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Appropriate Remedy, 13 September 2007 (“Rwamakuba Appeal Decision”), para. 24. See also Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 255.
 Rwamakuba Appeal Decision, para. 27.
 Rwamakuba Appeal Decision, para. 27 and references cited therein.
 Cf. Rwamakuba Appeal Decision, para. 27; The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on Appropriate Remedy, 31 January 2007 (“Rwamakuba Decision”), para. 69; Bagosora et al. Trial Judgement, para. 97.