Review of an administrative decision

Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Adequate Facilities - 07.05.2009 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR73.2)

10. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is well established that in undertaking a first judicial review of an administrative decision, the Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber or President, as the case may be, must apply the standard set out in the Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision.[1] The Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision first considered the nature of a judicial review of an administrative decision:

A judicial review of such an administrative decision is not a rehearing. Nor is it an appeal, or in any way similar to the review which a Chamber may undertake of its own judgment in accordance with Rule 119 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A judicial review of an administrative decision made by the Registrar in relation to legal aid is concerned initially with the propriety of the procedure by which [the] Registrar reached the particular decision and the manner in which he reached it.[2]

With this approach in mind, the Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision then set out that an administrative decision by the Registrar will be quashed if the decision-maker:

(a) failed to comply with the legal requirements of the Directive, or

(b) failed to observe any basic rules of natural justice or to act with procedural fairness towards the person affected by the decision, or

(c) took into account irrelevant material or failed to take into account relevant material, or

(d) reached a conclusion which no sensible person who has properly applied his mind to the issue could have reached (the “unreasonableness” test).[3]

The Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision also specified that “[t]hese issues may in the particular case involve, at least in part, a consideration of the sufficiency of the material before the Registrar, but (in the absence of established unreasonableness) there can be no interference with the margin of appreciation of the facts or merits of that case to which the maker of such an administrative decision is entitled”.[4] Finally, in the review, the party contesting the administrative decision bears the onus of persuasion and must show that (a) an error of the nature described has occurred, and (b) that such error has significantly affected the impugned decision to his detriment.[5]

 

[1] See Prosecutor v. Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/l-PT, Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, 20 August 2003, para. 22; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajšnik, Case No. IT-00-39-PT, Decision on the Defence’s Motion for an Order Setting Aside the Registrar’s Decision Declaring Momčilo Krajšnik Partially Indigent for Legal Aid Purposes, 20 January 2004, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-PT, Decision on Defence Request for Review of the Registrar’s Decision on Partial Indigence of Mile Mrkšić, 9 March 2004, p. 3; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin [ljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-PT, Decision on Appointment of Co-Counsel for Mrkšić, 7 October 2005, para. 9.

[2] Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision [Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, Mlado Radić, Zoran Zigić and Dragoljub Prcać, Case No. IT-98-30-1/A, Decision on Review of Registrar’s Decision, 7 February 2003], para. 13.

[3] Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision, para. 13.

[4] Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision, para. 13. See also Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of Co-Counsel, 23 November 2006 (“Nahimana et al. Appeal Decision”), para. 9.

[5] Kvočka et al. Appeal Decision, para. 14. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Decision, para. 9; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel for Vidoje Blagojević’s Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-Counsel, 3 July 2003 (“Blagojević Trial Decision”), para. 116.

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Legal Aid - 07.02.2003 KVOČKA et al.
(IT-98-30/1-A)

13.     […] A judicial review of such an administrative decision is not a rehearing.  Nor is it an appeal, or in any way similar to the review which a Chamber may undertake of its own judgment in accordance with Rule 119 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  A judicial review of an administrative decision made by the Registrar in relation to legal aid is concerned initially with the propriety of the procedure by which Registrar reached the particular decision and the manner in which he reached it.  The administrative decision will be quashed if the Registrar has failed to comply with the legal requirements of the Directive.  This issue may in the particular case involve a consideration of the proper interpretation of the Directive.  The administrative decision will also be quashed if the Registrar has failed to observe any basic rules of natural justice or to act with procedural fairness towards the person affected by the decision, or if he has taken into account irrelevant material or failed to take into account relevant material, or if he has reached a conclusion which no sensible person who has properly applied his mind to the issue could have reached (the “unreasonableness” test).  These issues may in the particular case involve, at least in part, a consideration of the sufficiency of the material before the Registrar, but (in the absence of established unreasonableness) there can be no interference with the margin of appreciation of the facts or merits of that case to which the maker of such an administrative decision is entitled.  These standards for judicial review of administrative decisions rest on general principles of law derived from the principal legal systems.

14.     In the review, the accused bears the onus of persuasion.  He must persuade the Chamber conducting the review (a) that an error of the nature described has occurred, and (b) that such error has significantly affected the Registrar’s decision to his detriment.  If the accused fails to persuade the Chamber of either of these matters, the Registrar’s decision will be confirmed.  If the accused has persuaded the Chamber of both matters, the Registrar’s decision may be quashed and, if appropriate, the Chamber may also either rule that legal aid should be granted or, where it is satisfied that the accused has the means to remunerate counsel partially, refer the matter again to the Registrar for him to determine the portion of the cost of having counsel for which the accused does not have the means to pay.[1]  In some cases, it may be appropriate for the Chamber simply to quash the decision and to direct the Registrar to reconsider his decision in the light of the Chamber’s decision.  It is clear, from the implicit restriction that only the Registrar may determine the extent to which the accused has the means partially to remunerate counsel, that the power of the Chamber to substitute its own decision for that of the Registrar is limited.

[1]    The Tribunal pays that portion: Articles 6(C), 13(B)(ii).

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Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Indigence - 24.06.2016 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(MICT-13-55-A)

Page 3:

RECALLING that judicial review of an administrative decision made by the Registrar in relation to legal aid is concerned initially with the propriety of the procedure by which the decision was made and that the decision may be quashed if the Registrar: (i) has failed to comply with the relevant legal requirements; (ii) failed to observe any basic rules of natural justice or to act with procedural fairness towards the person affected by the decision; (iii) took into account irrelevant material or failed to take into account relevant material; or (iv) reached a conclusion which no sensible person who has properly applied his mind to the issue could have reached;[1]

RECALLING FURTHER that the party contesting the administrative decision bears the onus to show an error in the decision and that the error has significantly affected the decision to his detriment;[2]

[1] See The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, Decision on Ntahobali’s Request for Review of Registrar’s Decisions, 21 February 2014 (confidential and ex parte), public redacted version issued on 23 May 2016 (“Nyiramasuhuko et al. Decision”), para. 16; Karadžić ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision of 25 July 2014 [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5-5/18-AR73.13, Decision on Appeal from Decision on Indigence, 25 July 2014 (confidential and ex parte), public redacted version issued on 2 December 2014], para. 4; Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Public Redacted Version of the 25 July 2013 Decision on Slobodan Praljka’s Motion for Review of the Registrar’s Decision on Means, 28 August 2013 (“Prlić et al. Decision”), paras. 6, 30; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-AR73.2, Decision on Zdravko Tolimir’s Appeal Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II on the Registrar’s Decision Concerning Legal Aid, 12 November 2009 (confidential and ex parte), public redacted version filed on 28 February 2013 (“Tolimir Decision”), para. 8; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Review of Registrar’s Decision to Withdraw Legal Aid from Zoran Žigić, 7 February 2003 (“Kvočka et al. Decision”), para. 13.

[2] Tolimir Decision, para. 9 and references cited therein.

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Other instruments MICT Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel
Notion(s) Filing Case
Decision on Indigence - 24.06.2016 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(MICT-13-55-A)

Pages 4-5:

RECALLING that the Registry has the primary responsibility for matters relating to remuneration of counsel in respect of which it enjoys a margin of appreciation;[1]

REITERATING, however, that the Appeals Chamber has the inherent power to review matters affecting the rights of persons in proceedings before it, including the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence, pursuant to its statutory obligation to ensure the fairness of the proceedings;[2]

CONSIDERING that the inherent power to review such matters encompasses the power to make determinations concerning such matters where necessary to give full effect to statutory rights;[3]

RECALLING the statutory right of an accused to have legal assistance assigned to him where the interests of justice so require and without payment if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;[4]

RECALLING that the Directive was established to ensure legal assistance to indigent accused in the most efficient, economical, and equitable manner in order to safeguard the rights afforded under the Statute and the Rules;[5]

CONSIDERING the UN Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid, which provide that “[a] court may, having regard to the particular circumstances of a person and after considering the reasons for denial of legal aid, direct that that person be provided with legal aid, with or without his or her contribution, when the interests of justice so require”;[6]

[…]

CONSIDERING that the burden of proof is on the applicant for legal aid to demonstrate his inability to remunerate counsel and that once the applicant has provided information regarding his inability to do so the burden of proof shifts to the Registry to prove otherwise based on the balance of probablities;[7]

[1] Decision on the Registry’s Request for Observations Regarding Preparation of the Notice of Appeal, 4 May 2016, p. 1 (“the Registry has the primary responsibility in the determination of matters relating to remuneration of counsel”); Nyiramasuhuko et al. Decision [The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, Decision on Ntahobali’s Request for Review of Registrar’s Decisions, 21 February 2014 (confidential and ex parte), public redacted version issued on 23 May 2016], para. 17; Tolimir Decision [Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-AR73.2, Decision on Zdravko Tolimir’s Appeal Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II on the Registrar’s Decision Concerning Legal Aid, 12 November 2009 (confidential and ex parte), public redacted version filed on 28 February 2013], paras. 8, 9 and referenced cited therein.

[2] See Article 19 of the Statute of the Mechanism (“Statute”). See also Nyiramasuhuko et al. Decision, para. 14; Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Decision on Nebojša Pavković’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings, 2 March 2010, para. 12; In Re. André Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A28, Decision on Motion for Leave to Appeal the President’s Decision of 31 March 2008 and the Decision of Trial Chamber III Rendered on 15 May 2008, 11 September 2008, para. 12.

[3] Nyiramasuhuko et al. Decision, para. 21 (“[t]he Appeals Chamber is of the view that judicial economy is best served in the particular circumstances of this case by disposing of the merits of this part of the Request for Review rather than remitting the matter to the Registrar”).

[4] Article 19(4)(d) of the Statute. See also Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism.

[5] Directive [Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, MICT/5, 14 November 2012], Article 1. The Appeals Chamber also recalls that, under Articles 6(B) and 6(C) of the Directive, an accused who lacks the means to remunerate counsel shall have the right to have counsel assigned to him and paid for by the Mechanism and that, for an accused who has the means to partially remunerate counsel, the Mechanism shall pay that portion of his defence costs which the accused does not have sufficient means to cover, as determined in accordance with the Registry Policy for Determining the Extent to which an Accused is able to Remunerate Counsel.

[6] UN Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid, para. 41(e).

[7] Prlić et al Decision [Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Public Redacted Version of the 25 July 2013 Decision on Slobodan Praljka’s Motion for Review of the Registrar’s Decision on Means, 28 August 2013], para. 35; Kvočka et al. Decision [Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Review of Registrar’s Decision to Withdraw Legal Aid from Zoran Žigić, 7 February 2003], para. 12.

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