Judgement of Acquittal

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 05.07.2001 JELISIĆ Goran
(IT-95-10-A)

The Trial Chamber decided that when acting proprio motu pursuant to a Rule 98bis judgement of acquittal, the prosecution had no right to be heard on the question of whether its evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Appeals Chamber held:

27. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the fact that a Trial Chamber has a right to decide proprio motu entitles it to make a decision whether or not invited to do so by a party; but the fact that it can do so does not relieve it of the normal duty of a judicial body first to hear a party whose rights can be affected by the decision to be made.[1]  Failure to hear a party against whom the Trial Chamber is provisionally inclined is not consistent with the requirement to hold a fair trial.[2]  The Rules must be read on this basis, that is to say, that they include a right of the parties to be heard in accordance with the judicial character of the Trial Chamber.  The availability of this right to the prosecution and its exercise of the right can be of importance to the making of a correct decision by the Trial Chamber: the latter could benefit in substantial ways from the analysis of the evidence made by the prosecution and from its argument on the applicable law.[3]

[1] See generally R. v. Barking and Dagenham Justices, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1995] Crim LR 953 (“Barking case”), and Director of Public Prosecution v. Cosier, Q.B.D., 5 April 2000 (“Cosier case”).

[2] See Cosier case, supra.

[3] See Cosier case, supra. For a more general observation on the importance of not deciding without first hearing counsel’s arguments, see Judge ad hoc Barwick’s dissenting opinion in Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.  442.

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 05.07.2001 JELISIĆ Goran
(IT-95-10-A)

36. [T]he notion of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt must be retained in the operation of Rule 98bis(B). This was recognised by Trial Chamber II’s decision in Kunarac.  The test applied in that case was correctly stated to be “whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could convict - that is to say, evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge in question. If the evidence does not reach that standard, then the evidence is, to use the words of Rule 98bis(B), ‘insufficient to sustain a conviction’”.[1] […]

37. The next question is how should the test of guilt beyond reasonable doubt be applied in this situation. The Appeals Chamber considers that the reference in Rule 98bis to a situation in which “the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction” means a case in which, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, the prosecution evidence, if believed,[2] is insufficient for any reasonable trier of fact to find that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber follows its recent holding in the Delalić appeal judgement, where it said: “[t]he test applied is whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge in question”.[3] The capacity[4] of the prosecution evidence (if accepted) to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt by a reasonable trier of fact is the key concept; thus the test is not whether the trier would in fact arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecution evidence (if accepted) but whether it could.  At the close of the case for the prosecution, the Chamber may find that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt and yet, even if no defence evidence is subsequently adduced, proceed to acquit at the end of the trial, if in its own view of the evidence, the prosecution has not in fact proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

See also paras. 33–35, 68.

[1] Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al, Case Nos.: IT-96-23-T, IT-23-1-T, Decision on motion for acquittal, 3 July 2000 (“the Kunarac decision”), para. 3, p. 3 (emphasis in original). And see, ibid., paras 7 - 8, pp. 4-5.

[2] As to the permissibility of drawing inferences at the close of the case for the prosecution, see Monteleone v. The Queen [1987] 2 S.C.R. 154, in which McIntyre J., for the court, said: “It is not for the trial judge to draw inferences of fact from the evidence before him”.  And see the reference to “inferences” in Her Majesty v. Al Megrahi and Another, infra. Cf. Kvočka decision, para. 12, p. 5, in which the Trial Chamber said: “The Chamber prefers an objective standard, under which it is entitled at this stage to apply any reasonable inferences and presumption or legal theories when reviewing the Prosecution evidence”.  The issue thus posed is not passed upon here.

[3]Delalić appeal judgement, para. 434, p. 148 (emphasis in original).  Or, as it was correctly put by Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac decision, para. 10, p. 6, the “prosecution needs only to show that there is evidence upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could convict, not that the Trial Chamber itself should convict” (emphasis in original).

[4] According to MacKinnon A.C.J.O. in R. v. Syms (1979) 47 C.C.C. (2d) 114 at 117, a trial judge should withdraw a case from the jury only where “the evidence was so slight or tenuous that it would be incapable of supporting a verdict of guilty”.

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis
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Rule 98bis Judgement - 11.07.2013 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1)

9. The appeals chamber recalls that an appeal against an acquittal entered at the Rule 98 bis stage of a case is an appeal against a judgement.[1] Thus, in an appeal of a rule 98 bis judgement of acquittal, the proceedings are governed by Article 25 of the Statute and by the standards of appellate review for alleged errors of law and alleged errors of fact. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the test to be applied by the trial chamber at the Rule 98 bis stage is “whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a reasonable [trier] of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge in question”,[2] not whether an accused’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.[3]

10. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the parties’ relevant submissions impel adoption of a different standard of review. The passage in the Halilović Appeal Judgement which Karadžić discusses simply confirms that appeals challenging factual findings shall be subject to the same standard of deferential review whether the appeals are lodged by the Prosecution or by a convicted person.[4] The Appeals Chamber’s holding in Halilović does not demonstrate that judgements of acquittal pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules are exclusively reviewed under the standard of review for alleged errors of fact, as Karadžić appears to argue. Likewise, and contrary to the Prosecution’s submission, the Jelisić Appeal Judgement does not hold that the Appeals Chamber must always engage in an evidentiary assessment de novo when reviewing a challenge to a Rule 98 bis judgement of acquittal. In Jelisić, the Appeals Chamber merely concluded that the trial chamber had erred as a matter of law at the Rule 98 bis stage of a trial by failing to take the evidence at its highest, and, in view of this conclusion, proceeded to articulate the correct standard and apply that standard to the evidence on the record.[5]

[1] [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1] Decision on Motion to Strike Prosecution’s Brief, 9 November 2012, para. 8. See generally Rule 98 bis of the Rules.

[2] Čelibići Appeal Judgement, para. 434 (emphasis in original). See also Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 37.

[3] See Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 56.

[4] See Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 11.

[5] Jelisić Appeal Judgement, paras 55-72. See also Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 39. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis
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Appeal Judgement - 18.12.2014 NGIRABATWARE Augustin
(MICT-12-29-A)

19.       The Appeals Chamber notes that, in its Rule 98bis Decision, the Trial Chamber correctly recalled the applicable law.[1] With respect to Counts 1 and 5 of the Indictment, the Trial Chamber found that there was “evidence which, if accepted, could satisfy a reasonable trier of fact of Ngirabatware’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”.[2] In the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request to withdraw the charge of conspiracy to commit genocide under Count 1,[3] and acquitted Ngirabatware of extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 5 of the Indictment.[4] In arguing that this is indicative of an error in the standard of proof applied by the Trial Chamber in its Rule 98bis Decision, Ngirabatware conflates the various evidentiary thresholds. As recalled above, a judgement of acquittal shall only be entered pursuant to Rule 98bis of the ICTR Rules if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. At that stage a trial chamber is required to “assume that the prosecution’s evidence [is] entitled to credence unless incapable of belief” and “take the evidence at its highest”.[5] In contrast, pursuant to Rule 87 of the ICTR Rules, at the end of the trial a trial chamber may reach a finding of guilt only if it is satisfied that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

20.       The standard “‘beyond reasonable doubt’ connotes that the evidence establishes a particular point and it is beyond dispute that any reasonable alternative is possible.”[6] It requires that the trial chamber be satisfied that there is no reasonable explanation of the evidence other than the guilt of the accused.[7] Accordingly, a dismissal of a request for a judgement of acquittal on a particular count at the close of the Prosecution case-in-chief is not incompatible with an acquittal of the accused on that same count at the end of the trial. In the same vein, a Prosecution’s decision to withdraw a charge at the end of the trial does not demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction in relation to that charge at the close of the Prosecution case-in-chief.[8] Ngirabatware thus fails to show that the Trial Chamber erred in law or fact in failing to grant his Rule 98bis Motion in relation to Counts 1 and 5 of the Indictment.[9]

[1] Rule 98bis Decision [The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 14 October 2010], paras. 22-23, 25.

[2] Rule 98bis Decision, paras. 32, 46.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 17.

[4] Trial Judgement, para. 1379.

[5] Karad`ić Rule 98bis Judgement [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karad`ić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, Judgement, 11 July 2013 ], para. 21, citing Jelisi} Appeal Judgement, para. 55.

[6] Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.

[7] D. Milo{evi} Appeal Judgement, para. 20, citing Mrk{i} and [ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement, para. 220. See also Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 61.

[8] Concerning Ngirabatware’s submission that the Prosecution impermissibly proceeded in relation to Count 1 (See Appeal Brief [Dr. Ngirabatware’s Appeal Brief (confidential), 18 June 2013; Corrigendum to Dr. Ngirabatware’s Appeal Brief (confidential), 16 July 2013; Dr. Ngirabatware’s Appeal Brief (amended public redacted version), 1 August 2013], para. 273), the Appeals Chamber notes that Ngirabatware fails to show that the Prosecution did not intend to prove this count in the course of the trial. See Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 43.

[9] The Appeals Chamber need not address Ngirabatware’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred in the Rule 98bis Decision by failing to provide a reasoned opinion in relation to Count 5 of the Indictment, as the alleged error does not impact on Ngirabatware’s conviction. See Reply Brief [ Dr. Ngirabatware’s Brief in Reply to Prosecution Respondent’s Brief (Pursuant to Rule 140 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), 13 August 2013], para. 106(ii).

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis
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Rule 98bis Judgement - 11.07.2013 KARADŽIĆ Radovan
(IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1)

37. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a judgement of acquittal shall only be entered pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules “if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction”.[1] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber recalls that pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules, a trial chamber is required to “assume that the prosecution’s evidence [is] entitled to credence unless incapable of belief” and “take the evidence at its highest”.[2] The Appeals Chamber notes that the evidence reviewed by the Trial Chamber, taken at its highest, indicates that Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats suffered injuries, including rape and severe non-fatal physical violence which are, on their face, suggestive of causing serious bodily harm.[3] While the commission of individual paradigmatic acts does not automatically demonstrate that the actus reus of genocide has taken place, the Appeals Chamber considers that no reasonable trial chamber reviewing the specific evidence on the record in this case, including evidence of sexual violence and of beatings causing serious physical injuries,[4] could have concluded that it was insufficient to establish the actus reus of genocide in the context of Rule 98 bis of the Rules. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber failed to take the evidence at its highest.

[1] Rule 98 bis of the Rules. See also supra [Judgement], para. 9.

[2] Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 55.

[3] Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 46. See also Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 48 (referring to “heinous crimes that obviously constitute serious bodily or mental harm, such as rape and torture”).

[4] See supra [Judgement], nn. 86-107. 

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ICTR Rule Rule 98 bis ICTY Rule Rule 98 bis