Extermination

Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 12.03.2008 SEROMBA Athanase
(ICTR-2001-66-A)

189. The Appeals Chamber recalls that extermination as a crime against humanity under Article 3(b) of the Statute is the act of killing on a large scale.[1] The Appeals Chamber stresses that in the jurisprudence of both ad hoc Tribunals, the necessary actus reus underlying the crime of extermination consists of any act, omission, or combination thereof which contributes directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals.[2] Therefore, as the Appeals Chamber has previously considered in the Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, for the actus reus of extermination to be fulfilled, it is sufficient that the accused participated in measures indirectly causing death.[3] The Appeals Chamber will therefore now turn to assess whether Athanase Seromba’s acts as established by the Trial Chamber amount to acts underlying the commission of extermination.

190. Notwithstanding the confinement of the Gacumbitsi dictum regarding committing to genocide, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, can find no reason why its reasoning should not be equally applicable to the crime of extermination. The key question raised by the Gacumbitsi dictum is what other acts can constitute direct participation in the actus reus of the crime. As noted above, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the acts of Athanase Seromba set out in the Judgement were sufficient to constitute direct participation in the actus reus of the crime of genocide, and is equally satisfied that the same acts are sufficient to constitute direct participation in the crime of extermination, in line with the Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, as discussed above. With respect to Athanase Seromba’s mens rea, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the role he played in the events that led to the destruction of the church, his knowledge that such destruction would inevitably result in the death of a large number of Tutsi civilians,[4] as well as his awareness of the widespread and systematic attack against the Tutsi population[5] occurring at the time, all demonstrate that he possessed the required intent to commit extermination. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds, Judge Liu dissenting, that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that Athanase Seromba had not committed extermination as a crime against humanity.[6]

Also see infra on Judge Liu’s Dissenting Opinion.

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the act of killing must occur within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population for national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.

[2] See, inter alia, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 389; Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 573. See also Ndindabahizi Trial Judgement, para. 479.

[3] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 123 and fn. 268.

[4] Trial Judgement, para. 367.

[5] Trial Judgement, para. 370.

[6] See Stakić Appeal Judgement at paragraph 59, where the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated the following:

To avoid such uncertainty and ensure respect for the values of consistency and coherence in the application of the law, the Appeals Chamber must intervene to assess whether the mode of liability applied by the Trial Chamber is consistent with the jurisprudence of this Tribunal. If it is not consistent, the Appeals Chamber must then determine whether the Trial Chamber’s factual findings support liability under another, established mode of liability […].

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 22.03.2006 STAKIĆ Milomir
(IT-97-24-A)

The Appeals Chamber, seized of the question whether the Trial Chamber correctly defined the elements of the crime of extermination, adopted the definition given in the Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, in which the ICTR Appeals Chamber held:

522. [T]he Appeals Chamber finds that the crime of extermination requires proof that the accused participated in a widespread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a number of people to conditions of living that would inevitably lead to death [actus reus], and that the accused intended by his acts or omissions this result [mens rea].[1]

516. […] Extermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not required for murder.”[2] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the crime of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.[3] The expressions “on a large scale” or “large number” do not, however, suggest a numerical minimum.[4]

For a full account of the Appeals Chamber’s discussion of the crime of extermination, see paras 252-261.

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 522.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 591. This position has been endorsed in all the ICTR Trial Judgements: Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 142; Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 82; Musema Trial Judgement, para. 217; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 86; Semanza Trial Judgement, para. 340; Niyitekega Trial Judgement, para. 450; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 890; Media Trial Judgement, para. 1044; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, para. 691. See also, ICTY, Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 503; Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 227; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 639.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 232.

[4] Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 145; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 87; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 891; Media Trial Judgement, para. 1044; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, para. 692. 

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.09.2011 MUNYAKAZI Yussuf
(ICTR-97-36A-A)

141. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly set forth the requisite elements of the mens rea for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. In particular, the Trial Chamber observed that for genocide an accused must act “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such”. With respect to extermination as a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber recalled that an accused must “intend to kill persons on a massive scale or to subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their death in a widespread or systematic manner.” The Trial Chamber further observed that the perpetrator must have acted with knowledge that his acts formed part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.

142. The Trial Chamber established Munyakazi’s intent to participate in the crimes based on his personal participation and leadership role in attacks, which resulted in the death of thousands of mostly Tutsi civilians. The Appeals Chamber can identify no error in this approach. The Appeals Chamber has held that an accused’s intent to participate in a crime may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including his active participation in an attack. Indeed, contrary to Munyakazi’s suggestion, “[t]he inquiry is not whether the specific intent was formed prior to the commission of the acts, but whether at the moment of commission the perpetrators possessed the necessary intent.” The lack of evidence concerning Munyakazi’s personal views about Tutsis does not undermine the reasonableness of the Trial Chamber’s findings. Furthermore, the evidence of his active participation in the killing of thousands of Tutsi civilians at two parishes reasonably demonstrates that he possessed both genocidal intent and the requisite intent for extermination as a crime against humanity, that is, the intent to kill on a large scale with awareness that the crimes formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against Tutsi civilians.

[1] Trial Judgement, paras. 493, 504, 506.

[2] Trial Judgement, para. 493.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 506.

[4] Trial Judgement, paras. 503, 504.

[5] Trial Judgement, paras. 380, 423, 491, 496, 500, 507.

[6] See, e.g., Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 61; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 524; Seromba Appeal Judgement, paras. 176, 177.

[7] Simba Appeal Judgement, paras. 262, 266.

[8] Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 266.

[9] See Trial Judgement, paras. 499, 500.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

1026. The Appeals Chamber observes in this respect that in the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that cumulative convictions are permissible for persecution and other inhumane acts, since each offence has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.[1] Relying on this jurisprudence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found in the Stakić Appeal Judgement that it was permissible to enter cumulative convictions for extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity on the basis of the same facts. It found that extermination requires proof that the accused caused the death of a large number of people, while persecution requires proof that an act or omission was in fact discriminatory and that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate.[2] The Appeals Chamber endorses the analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

1027. According to the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that it is permissible to convict Appellant Barayagwiza cumulatively of both persecution and extermination on the basis of the same facts, Judge Güney dissenting from this finding.

[1] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras. 1040-1043.

[2] Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras. 364, 367.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 28.11.2007 NAHIMANA et al. (Media case)
(ICTR-99-52-A)

1029. It is established case-law that cumulative convictions for genocide and crime against humanity are permissible on the basis of the same acts, as each has a materially distinct element from the other, namely, on the one hand, “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”, and, on the other, “a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population”.[1]

[1] Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 426; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 318. With specific reference to cumulative convictions for genocide and extermination, see Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 366-367, 370. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.12.2013 NDAHIMANA Grégoire
(ICTR-01-68-A)

231. It is well-established that a large number of victims is not an element of the crime of genocide. The Appeals Chamber also recalls that, with respect to extermination as a crime against humanity, “a particularly large number of victims can be an aggravating circumstance in relation to the sentence for this crime if the extent of the killings exceeds that required for extermination.” The Appeals Chamber further recalls that extermination is the act of killing on a “large scale”, and that “large scale” does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a minimum number of victims. While extermination as a crime against humanity has been found in relation to the killing of thousands of persons, it has also been found in relation to fewer killings, such as the killings of approximately 60 individuals and less. In the present case, the Trial Chamber found that the attacks on Nyange Church resulted “in the death of approximately 2,000 Tutsi men, women and children.” The Appeals Chamber considers that the extent of the killings at Nyange Church on 15 and 16 April 1994 exceeded that required for extermination, and that the number of victims could therefore be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance in the determination of the sentence. The Appeals Chamber accordingly rejects Ndahimana’s contention that the Trial Chamber engaged in impermissible double-counting in considering the number of victims of the attacks on NyangeChurch as an aggravating factor.

[1] See, e.g., Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 135.

[2] Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 135.

[3] See, e.g., Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 394; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 185.

[4] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537, referring to Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260 and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[5] See Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, paras. 537, 544, fns. 1564-1567, and references contained therein. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 398.

[6] Trial Judgement, para. 854. 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.01.2007 NDINDABAHIZI Emmanuel
(ICTR-01-71-A)

The Appeals Chamber found:

135.  […] the Trial Chamber did not err in considering the large number of victims at Gitwa Hill as an aggravating circumstance relevant to the sentence. As to the conviction for genocide, there need not be a large number of victims to enter a genocide conviction. As for extermination, the actus reus requires “killing on a large scale”.[1] While this does not “suggest a numerical minimum”,[2] a particularly large number of victims can be an aggravating circumstance in relation to the sentence for this crime if the extent of the killings exceeds that required for extermination. In the present case, there is no indication that, in considering aggravating circumstances, the Trial Chamber looked at only those killings required for extermination when it specifically cited the fact that “thousands” of people were killed.[3]

 

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[2] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 508(ii).

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.04.2015 TOLIMIR Zdravko
(IT-05-88/2-A)

146.    With regard to Tolimir’s argument that the killing of the three Žepa leaders was not part of the one murder operation involving the mass killings of the men of Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of the crime of extermination is “the act of killing on a large scale”[1] and the mens rea is the intention to kill on a large-scale.[2] It further recalls that the crime of extermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of massiveness, which is not required for murder.[3] The Appeals Chamber has clarified that:

The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred. Relevant factors include, inter alia: the time and place of the killings; the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted; and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity.[4]

147.    The actus reus of the crime of extermination may be established through an aggregation of separate incidents. It is not required that the killings be on a vast scale in a concentrated location over a short period of time.[6] The ICTR Appeals Chamber has, on the other hand, stated that “[a]s a general matter, the element of killing on a large scale cannot be satisfied by a collective consideration of distinct events committed in different locations, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over an extended period of time, i.e. a period of two months”.[7]

See also paras 148-150.

[1]    Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259.

[2]    Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para.701 citing Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259. The Appeals Chamber observes that Tolimir does not specify whether he challenges the actus reus or the mens rea of the crime of extermination or both with regard to killing of the three Žepa leaders. Appeal Brief, para. 69; Reply Brief, paras 34-35.

[3]    Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[4]    Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538 (internal citations omitted).

[5]    Cf. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662.

[6]    Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, affirming Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 640.

[7]    Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396. The Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement further specifies that in that case, each of the incidents which formed the basis of the appellant’s convictions presented distinct features and could not be said to constitute one and the same incident, referring to incidents as described in the sections addressing grounds of appeal 6-10. In the Karemera and Ngirumpatse case, the Appeals Chamber nevertheless found it permissible for the trial chamber in that particular case, to connect and aggregate sets of killings in order to meet the large-scale requirement. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662. The Appeals Chamber referred to sets of “massive killings throughout Rwanda by mid-July 1994”. Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 13.12.2004 NTAKIRUTIMANA and NTAKIRUTIMANA
(ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A)

542. […] the Musema Appeals Chamber held that the crime of genocide under Article 2 of the Statute and the crime of extermination under Article 3 of the Statute each contained a materially distinct element not required by the other. The materially distinct element of genocide is the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The materially distinct element of extermination, as a crime against humanity, is the requirement that the crime was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.[1] Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber held that convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity, based on the same facts, are permissible.[2] This conclusion has recently been confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case.[3]

[1] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 366.

[2] Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 370.

[3] Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras. 219-227. 

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 2
Article 3
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 13.12.2004 NTAKIRUTIMANA and NTAKIRUTIMANA
(ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A)

542. […] Conviction for murder as a crime against humanity and conviction for extermination as a crime against humanity, based on the same set of facts, however, cannot be cumulative.[1] Murder as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from extermination as a crime against humanity; each involves killing within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, and the only element that distinguishes these offences is the requirement of the offence of extermination that the killings occur on a mass scale.

[1] See Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, paras. 647-650; Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 422; Musema Trial Judgement, para. 957; Semanza Trial Judgement, paras. 500-505.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 13.12.2004 NTAKIRUTIMANA and NTAKIRUTIMANA
(ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A)

517. In finding that an element of the crime of extermination was the “killing of certain named or described persons”[1] the Trial Chamber purported to be following the Akayesu Trial Judgement,[2] which it found had since been followed in Rutaganda and Musema.[3] More recently, this element was also stated in the Niyitegeka Trial Judgement.[4] In other judgements issued by ICTR Trial Chambers “certain named or described persons” has not been considered to be an element of the crime of extermination.[5] Further, none of the judgements of the ICTY which have considered the charge of extermination has identified killing “certain named or described persons” to be an element of the crime of extermination.[6]

518.    The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that customary international law does not consider a precise description or designation by name of victims to be an element of the crime of extermination. […]

522. […] the Appeals Chamber finds that the crime of extermination requires proof that the accused participated in a widespread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a number of people to conditions of living that would inevitably lead to death, and that the accused intended by his acts or omissions this result. Applying this definition, the Trial Chamber erred in law by interpreting the requirement of “killing of certain named or described persons” to be an element of the crime of extermination.

See also paras. 518-521.

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 592.

[2] Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 592.

[3] Trial Judgement, n. 1154. It must be noted that this definition was not challenged on appeal in Rutaganda and Musema.

[4] Niyitekega Trial Judgement, para. 450.

[5] Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, paras. 142-147; Bagilishema Trial Judgement para. 89; Semanza Trial Judgement, paras. 340-463; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, paras. 891-893; Media Trial Judgement, para. 1044; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, paras. 691-695.

[6] Krstić Trial Judgement, paras. 495-505; Vasiljević Trial Judgement, paras. 216-233; Stakić Trial Judgement, paras. 638-661. Although the definition in the Akayesu Judgement is mentioned in the Krstić Judgement, it should be noted, however, that the Trial Chamber in Krstić did not endorse this definition and preferred to make its own assessment to determine the underlying elements of extermination. It seems, moreover, that the Trial Chamber in Krstić decided on the need for identification of the victims (para. 499) as a mere requirement of identification of the victims as civilians. 

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 13.12.2004 NTAKIRUTIMANA and NTAKIRUTIMANA
(ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A)

530. The actus reus for aiding and abetting the crime of extermination is that the accused carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of that crime. This support must have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. The requisite mens rea is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the crime of extermination committed by the principal. If it is established that the accused provided a weapon to one principal, knowing that the principal will use that weapon to take part with others in a mass killing, as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, and if the mass killing in question occurs, the fact that the weapon procured by the accused “only” killed a limited number of persons is irrelevant to determining the accused’s responsibility as an aider and abettor of the crime of extermination.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 13.12.2004 NTAKIRUTIMANA and NTAKIRUTIMANA
(ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A)

516. […] The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the crime of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.[1] The expressions “on a large scale” or “large number” do not, however, suggest a numerical minimum.[2] […]

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 232.

[2] Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgement, para. 145; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 87; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 891; Media Trial Judgement, para. 1044; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement, para. 692. 

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010 RUKUNDO Emmanuel
(ICTR-2001-70-A)

185. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the crime of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.[1] The expression “on a large scale” does not, however, suggest a numerical minimum.[2] As a crime against humanity, the act of killing must occur within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.[3]

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[2] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[3] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 BAGOSORA et al. (Military I)
(ICTR-98-41-A)

394. Extermination as a crime against humanity under Article 3(b) of the Statute is the act of killing on a large scale,[1] committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.[2]

396. The […] Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable to conclude that the “large scale” requirement for extermination was satisfied based on a collective consideration of events committed in different prefectures, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over a period of two months. Each of the incidents which formed the basis of Nsengiyumva’s convictions presented distinct features and could not be said to constitute one and the same incident.[1] As such, they could not be considered to constitute one and the same crime sharing the same actus reus.

397. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber nonetheless suggested that some of the killings of which the co-Accused were convicted “in themselves” satisfied the requirement of killing on a large scale.[1] However, the Trial Chamber failed to make any factual findings as to whether the killings perpetrated in Gisenyi town on 7 April 1994 met the requisite threshold of having been committed “on a large scale” in themselves.[2] With respect to the killings in Gisenyi town, the Trial Chamber’s findings are limited to stating that “targeted attacks against Tutsis and suspected accomplices” were perpetrated.[3] The Appeals Chamber is concerned that the Trial Chamber did not make any specific findings on this fundamental element of the crime of extermination.

398. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber considers that the facts as found by the Trial Chamber and the evidence it relied upon support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the killings in Gisenyi town were perpetrated on a large scale. The Appeals Chamber notes with respect to the Gisenyi town killings that the Trial Chamber accepted and relied upon Prosecution Witness DO’s evidence that the victims included: a Tutsi teacher and his daughter; Hutus suspected of being accomplices, such as Daniel Rwabijongo, as well as Assoumani Kajanja and his Tutsi wife; Gilbert and another Tutsi man hiding in a compound with him; and a Tutsi woman named Mukabutare and her daughter.[4] Witness DO testified that there were several other groups of assailants apart from the one he was assigned to that were perpetrating parallel killings throughout Gisenyi town at the same time.[5] In the Appeals Chamber’s view, these killings are qualifiable as having occurred on a large scale.

[1] Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 185; Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 189; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[2] Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 185; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

 

[1] Trial Judgement, para. 2193.

[2] In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the expression “on a large scale” does not suggest a numerical minimum. See Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 185; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[3] Trial Judgement, para. 1064. See also ibid., paras. 2077, 2140, 2141.

[4] Trial Judgement, paras. 1016, 2140. See also Witness DO, T. 30 June 2003 pp. 24-36, 42-45, T. 1 July 2003 pp. 47‑51, 63-65, T. 2 July 2003 pp. 12-17, 54-56, and T. 17 October 2005 pp. 14-19; Decision on Anatole Nsengiyumva’s Motions for the Admission of Additional Evidence, 21 March 2011, para. 22.

[5] Witness DO, T. 30 June 2003 pp. 28, 29, 33-35; T. 1 July 2003 pp. 35-38, 48, 49. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 1016, 1066.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 BAGOSORA et al. (Military I)
(ICTR-98-41-A)

416. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that cumulative convictions for extermination and murder as crimes against humanity based on the same set of facts are not permissible because, whereas extermination requires the materially distinct element that the killings occur on a mass scale, murder does not contain an element materially distinct from extermination.[1] The Trial Chamber therefore erred in law in entering cumulative convictions for murder and extermination as crimes against humanity for the killings in Gisenyi town. Since the offence of extermination contains an additional materially distinct element,[2] which is present in the instant case,[3] the Appeals Chamber concludes that Nsengiyumva’s convictions for extermination entered under Count 6 of the Nsengiyumva Indictment should be upheld while his convictions for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 5 should be vacated.

736. Bagosora did not formally raise any error vis-à-vis his cumulative convictions for murder and extermination as crimes against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber recalls its holding above in connection with Nsengiyumva’s appeal that cumulative convictions for extermination and murder as crimes against humanity based on the same set of facts are not permissible because murder as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from extermination as a crime against humanity.[4] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds, proprio motu, that the Trial Chamber erred in law in convicting Bagosora of both murder and extermination as crimes against humanity based on the same facts. In this context, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the more specific provision should be upheld.[5] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber concludes that Bagosora’s conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Bagosora Indictment pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute should be reversed, while his conviction for extermination under Count 6 of the Bagosora Indictment should be affirmed.

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542.

[2] See Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 386, citing Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 413: “Where this test is not met, the Chamber must decide in relation to which offence it will enter a conviction. This should be done on the basis of the principle that the conviction under the more specific provision should be upheld. Thus, if a set of facts is regulated by two provisions, one of which contains an additional materially distinct element, then a conviction should be entered only under that provision”. See also Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 321.

[3] See supra, para. 398.

[4] See supra, para. 416.

[5] See supra, fn. 961.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011 BAGOSORA et al. (Military I)
(ICTR-98-41-A)

414. The Appeals Chamber notes that the permissibility of cumulative convictions for the crimes of murder as a crime against humanity and persecution as a crime against humanity has been specifically considered by the Appeals Chamber.[1] The Appeals Chamber has found that the crime of persecution requires a materially distinct element to be proven that is not present as an element in the crime of murder, namely proof that an act or omission discriminates in fact and that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate.[2] The crime of murder was also held to require proof of a materially distinct element that is not required to be proven in establishing the crime of persecution, namely proof of the death of one or more persons.[3] Therefore, cumulative convictions for murder and persecution as crimes against humanity were found to be permissible.[4] The Appeals Chamber accordingly finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in convicting Nsengiyumva for both murder and persecution as crimes against humanity for the killings in Gisenyi town.[5]

416. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that cumulative convictions for extermination and murder as crimes against humanity based on the same set of facts are not permissible because, whereas extermination requires the materially distinct element that the killings occur on a mass scale, murder does not contain an element materially distinct from extermination.[1] The Trial Chamber therefore erred in law in entering cumulative convictions for murder and extermination as crimes against humanity for the killings in Gisenyi town. Since the offence of extermination contains an additional materially distinct element,[2] which is present in the instant case,[3] the Appeals Chamber concludes that Nsengiyumva’s convictions for extermination entered under Count 6 of the Nsengiyumva Indictment should be upheld while his convictions for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 5 should be vacated.

735. The Appeals Chamber confirms that cumulative convictions for extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity based on the same set of facts are permissible since each offence has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.[6] Extermination requires proof that the accused caused the death of a large number of people, while persecution necessitates evidence that an act or omission was in fact discriminatory and that the act or omission was perpetrated with the specific intent to discriminate.[7].

736. Bagosora did not formally raise any error vis-à-vis his cumulative convictions for murder and extermination as crimes against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber recalls its holding above in connection with Nsengiyumva’s appeal that cumulative convictions for extermination and murder as crimes against humanity based on the same set of facts are not permissible because murder as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from extermination as a crime against humanity.[1] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds, proprio motu, that the Trial Chamber erred in law in convicting Bagosora of both murder and extermination as crimes against humanity based on the same facts. In this context, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the more specific provision should be upheld.[2] Consequently, the Appeals Chamber concludes that Bagosora’s conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Bagosora Indictment pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute should be reversed, while his conviction for extermination under Count 6 of the Bagosora Indictment should be affirmed.

 

 

[1] See supra, para. 416.

[2] See supra, fn. 961.

[1] Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542.

[2] See Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 386, citing Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 413: “Where this test is not met, the Chamber must decide in relation to which offence it will enter a conviction. This should be done on the basis of the principle that the conviction under the more specific provision should be upheld. Thus, if a set of facts is regulated by two provisions, one of which contains an additional materially distinct element, then a conviction should be entered only under that provision”. See also Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 321.

[3] See supra, para. 398.

 

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 08.05.2012 NTABAKUZE Aloys
(ICTR-98-41A-A)

260. The Appeals Chamber recalls that cumulative convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.[1] An element is materially distinct if it requires proof of a fact that is not required by the other.[2] Applying this well-established principle, the Appeals Chamber recently reiterated that cumulative convictions for extermination and murder as crimes against humanity are not permissible, reasoning that, “whereas extermination requires the materially distinct element that the killings occur on a mass scale, murder does not contain an element materially distinct from extermination”.[3]

261. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in law in entering cumulative convictions for both murder and extermination as crimes against humanity for the killings perpetrated at Nyanza hill and IAMSEA.[4] Since the offence of extermination contains an additional materially distinct element and the conviction under the more specific provision should be retained,[5] the Appeals Chamber concludes that Ntabakuze’s convictions for extermination entered under Count 5 of the Indictment should be upheld, while his convictions for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Indictment should be vacated.

[1] See, e.g., Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 413; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 386, citing Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 412; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1019.

[2] See, e.g., Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 413; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 386, citing Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 412; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 425.

[3] Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 416, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 542. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 736.

[4] See Trial Judgement, paras. 2188, 2196, 2258.

[5] See Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 416, fn. 961, referring to Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 386, citing Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 413. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 736.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.01.2007 NDINDABAHIZI Emmanuel
(ICTR-01-71-A)

The Trial Chamber convicted the Appellant for committing extermination at Gitwa Hill, and, alternatively, for both instigating, and aiding and abetting extermination (Trial Judgement, para. 485). The Appeals Chamber proprio motu raised the issue of alternative convictions and held

122.  While an accused can be convicted for a single crime on the basis of several modes of liability, alternative convictions for several modes of liability are, in general, incompatible with the principle that a judgement has to express unambiguously the scope of the convicted person’s criminal responsibility. This principle requires, inter alia, that the sentence corresponds to the totality of guilt incurred by the convicted person. This totality of guilt is determined by the actus reus and the mens rea of the convicted person. The modes of liability may either augment (e.g., commission of the crime with direct intent) or lessen (e.g., aiding and abetting a crime with awareness that a crime will probably be committed[1]) the gravity of the crime.[2] Thus, the criminal liability of a convicted person has to be established unequivocally.

In the present case, the Appeals Chamber held, by majority, Judge Güney dissenting, that the Trial Chamber did not convict the Appellant in the alternative; rather, the Trial Chamber was seeking to provide a further characterisation of the Appellant’s criminal conduct, which constituted committing, instigating, and aiding and abetting.

For case-law on cumulative charging and the pleading principles on the various modes of liability, see Chapter VI of the Blaškić Appeal Judgement.

[1] See Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 50.

[2] In this context, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that it had taken into account the sentencing practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia applicable in that case, in particular the practice that “the sentence of a person who aided a principal perpetrator to commit a crime can be reduced to a sentence less than the one given to the principal perpetrator”, Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 270 (note omitted). 

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 17.03.2009 KRAJIŠNIK Momčilo
(IT-00-39-A)

388. Addressing the more specific issue of intra-Article 5 cumulative convictions, the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement ruled that a correct application of the Čelebići test required “an examination, as a matter of law, of the elements of each offence in the Statute that pertain to that conduct for which the accused has been convicted.” Based on this reasoning, the Appeals Chamber admitted that convictions for the crimes against humanity of persecution on the one hand, and murder, other inhumane acts and imprisonment on the other hand, could be cumulated, since all of these offences contained “an element that requires proof of a fact not required by the other[s]”.[1]

389. In the instant case, Amicus Curiae alleges that the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement is an incorrect application of the Čelebići test and should therefore not be used as a precedent. The Appeals Chamber cannot agree with this interpretation. While prior jurisprudence adopted another point of view,[2] in the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement the Appeals Chamber clearly explained the reasons that warranted the departure from previous cases.[3] Subsequent appeal judgements in the Stakić, Naletilić and Martinović and Nahimana et al. cases confirmed the approach adopted in Kordić and Čerkez.[4] The Appeals Chamber therefore sees no cogent reason to depart from the current jurisprudence with respect to intra-Article 5 cumulative convictions.

390. In the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber determined that:

[p]ersecution as a crime against humanity has a materially distinct element from murder as a crime against humanity in that persecution requires proof that an act or omission discriminates in fact, and proof that the act or omission was committed with specific intent to discriminate. Conversely, murder as a crime against humanity requires proof that the accused caused the victim’s death, which is not an element required for proof of persecution. As a result, a cumulative conviction for persecution and murder under Article 5 of the Statute is permissible. The same reasoning applies to extermination, deportation, and forced transfer as an inhumane act.[5]

391. The Appeals Chamber, by majority, Judge Güney dissenting,[6] considers that this is a correct application of the law on cumulative convictions. Therefore, the Trial Chamber did not err in cumulating the conviction for persecution as a crime against humanity with the convictions for the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer). This ground of appeal is dismissed.

[1] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 1040-1043.

[2] See Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 230-233; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, paras 144-146; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 188.

[3] Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 1040.

[4] See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 1026-1027; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, paras 587-591; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 355-367.

[5] Trial Judgement, para. 1130.

[6] See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Güney, para. 5.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3 ICTY Statute Article 5
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 16.11.2001 MUSEMA Alfred
(ICTR-96-13-A)

364.   In the case at bar, the Trial Chamber found Musema guilty of genocide (Count 1) and of extermination as a crime against humanity (Count 5) on the basis of the same set of facts.  Musema requests the reversal of the conviction for extermination.  The issue is whether such double conviction is permissible.

365.   Applying the provisions of the test articulated above, the first issue is whether a given statutory provision has a materially distinct element not contained in the other provision, an element being regarded as materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other.

366.   Genocide requires proof of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; this is not required by extermination as a crime against humanity.  Extermination as a crime against humanity requires proof that the crime was committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, which proof is not required in the case of genocide.

367.   As a result, the applicable test with respect to double convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity is satisfied; these convictions are permissible.  Accordingly, Musema’s ground of appeal on this point is dismissed.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 04.12.2012 LUKIĆ & LUKIĆ
(IT-98-32/1-A)

536. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of extermination is “the act of killing on a large scale”.[1] This element of “massiveness” is what distinguishes the crime of extermination from the crime of murder.[2] The mens rea of extermination requires the intention of the perpetrator “to kill on a large scale or to systematically subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths.”[3]

537. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “large scale” does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a minimum number of victims.[4] While extermination as a crime against humanity has been found in relation to the killing of thousands,[5] it has also been found in relation to fewer killings. The Appeals Chamber recalls that in Brđanin, the killing of between 68 to 300 individuals “in light of the circumstances in which they occurred, [met] the required threshold of massiveness for the purposes of extermination.”[6] In Stakić, the trial chamber found that the killing of less than 80 individuals “independently would reach the requisite level of massiveness for the purposes of an evaluation under Article 5(b) of the Statute”.[7] In Krajišnik, while the conviction for extermination as a crime against humanity was based on the killing of at least 1,916 individuals, the trial chamber found that the killing of approximately 66 individuals during the Pionirska Street Incident satisfied the element of massiveness.[8] The ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) have also found the killing of about 60 individuals and less to be sufficiently large-scale to amount to extermination.[9]

538. The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred.[10] Relevant factors include, inter alia: the time and place of the killings;[11] the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted;[12] and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity.[13] In Krstić, the trial chamber qualified the victimised population and held that:

“extermination” could also, theoretically, be applied to the commission of a crime which is not “widespread” but nonetheless consists in eradicating an entire population […] made up of only a relatively small number of people. In other words, while extermination generally involves a large number of victims, it may be constituted even where the number of victims is limited.[14] […] [T]here must be evidence that a particular population was targeted and that its members were killed or otherwise subjected to conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population.[15]

The Krstić trial chamber also stated that the preparation and organisation of the crime could be considered when determining the actus reus of extermination as a crime against humanity.[16] The International Law Commission articulated that “[e]xtermination is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals” and qualified that the individuals do not have to share any common characteristics.[17]

542. The Trial Chamber thus considered the number of victims when assessing whether the element of massiveness was met. It also took into consideration the specific circumstances of the case, such as the type of victims and, with regard to the Pionirska Street Incident, the area of origin of the victims.[18] While these factors may be taken into consideration in the assessment of whether the element of massiveness for extermination is fulfilled, they do not constitute elements of the crime of extermination as a crime against humanity.[19] Therefore, a trial chamber need not address these factors in its assessment. Milan Lukić’s arguments that the Trial Chamber inconsistently considered population density in relation to the Pionirska Street and the Bikavac Incidents therefore fail. Furthermore, as these factors do not constitute elements of the crime of extermination, there is no mens rea requirement in relation to them as suggested by Milan Lukić.

543. When referring to population density regarding the Pionirska Street Incident, the Trial Chamber essentially considered the number of individuals killed in a specific area in relation to the overall population of that area.[20] The Appeals Chamber notes that almost the entire Muslim population of Koritnik perished in the Pionirska Street Incident.[21] In these circumstances, the Trial Chamber reasonably found that the killing of 59 persons amounted to extermination as a crime against humanity. The limited reduction of the number of victims by the Appeals Chamber does not affect this conclusion.[22] Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber finds that using a single village as the reference area was not artificially narrow since Milan Lukić’s conviction rests on one incident which involved victims who were predominately from the same village.[23]

544. The Appeals Chamber further finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding that extermination was established in relation to the Bikavac Incident. The Trial Chamber reasonably found that the killing of at least 60 persons was sufficiently large–scale.

545. Moreover, Milan Lukić’s argument that the Tribunal and the ICTR have ensured that the element of massiveness is maintained at a high level[24] is not supported by either the jurisprudence of the Tribunal or that of the ICTR. This argument is therefore dismissed.

[1] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[2] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[3] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260.

[4] Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 398. The ICTR Appeals Chamber accepted the Trial Chamber’s finding that parallel killings were perpetrated at the same time and qualified as having occurred on a large scale, without ascertaining a precise numerical figure.

[5] See e.g. Krstić Trial Judgement, paras 79, 84, 426, 505. See also Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 521.

[6] Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 472.

[7] Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 653, referring to, inter alia, killings at Briševo where 77 Croats were killed (see Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 269). The Appeals Chamber did not address whether each incident would independently satisfy the requirement that the massiveness element had been met, but did uphold the conviction for extermination (Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 264).

[8] Krajišnik Trial Judgement, paras 699, 720, overturned on appeal for reasons other than the massiveness requirement (Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 177). See also Trial Judgement, para. 938.

[9] Setako Trial Judgement, para. 481 (30 to 40 victims) (this finding was upheld on appeal, Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 301); Sesay et al. Trial Judgement, paras 1107 (63 victims), 1271 (30 to 40 victims), 1449 (64 victims) (these findings were upheld on appeal, Sesay et al. Appeal Judgement, Chapter XII).

[10] Martić Trial Judgement, para. 63, referring to Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 640, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 391, Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 573, Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716, Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1061. See also Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 472, finding “that the scale of the killings, in light of the circumstances in which they occurred, meets the required threshold of massiveness for the purposes of extermination” (emphasis added).

[11] Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716. This finding was not overturned on appeal.

[12] Martić Trial Judgement, fn. 120; Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716; Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1061. These findings were not overturned on appeal.

[13] Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 653; Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 227. These findings were not overturned on appeal.

[14] Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 501 (emphasis added). This finding was not appealed. The trial chamber in Brđanin adopted this finding (Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 391), which was not appealed.

[15] Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 503 (emphasis added). This finding was not appealed.

[16] Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 501. This finding was not appealed. The trial chamber in Brđanin adopted this finding (Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 391), which was not appealed.

[17] Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No. 10 (UN Doc. A/51/10), Article 18, p. 48.

[18] Trial Judgement, paras 943, 945, 950.

[19] See Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[20] The Trial Chamber considered the characteristics of Koritnik, particularly that it was a “small and less densely populated villag[e]]” (Trial Judgement, para. 943). It noted that the Muslim area of Koritnik consisted of about 20 houses and was populated by approximately 60 people (Trial Judgement, para. 335. See also Trial Judgement, para. 945).

[21] Cf. Trial Judgement, para. 335.

[22] See supra [Appeal Judgement,] para. 353. See however Separate Opinion of Judge Morrison.

[23] See Trial Judgement, para. 943.

[24] Milan Lukić Appeal Brief, para. 224.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 29.09.2014 KAREMERA & NGIRUMPATSE
(ICTR-98-44-A)

661.   The Appeals Chamber is mindful that, as a general matter, the element of killing on a large scale cannot be satisfied by a collective consideration of distinct events committed in different prefectures, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over an extended period of time.[1] […]

[1] Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.

Download full document
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 30.06.2016 STANIŠIĆ & ŽUPLJANIN
(IT-08-91-A)

1036. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea for extermination has been defined as the intention of the perpetrator to: (i) kill on a large scale; or (ii) systematically subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths.[1] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has consistently held that the elements of the crime of extermination are the same as those required for murder as a crime against humanity, with the difference that extermination is killing on a large scale.[2] As such, the Appeals Chamber considers that the mens rea for extermination to “(i) kill on a large scale” can be met by establishing the mens rea for murder as a crime against humanity – i.e. the intent to: (i) kill the victim; or (ii) wilfully cause serious bodily harm which the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death[3] – plus the additional intention to do so on a large scale.[4]

[1] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 259-260. See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 1, para. 45.

[2] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260. See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 701.

[3] Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 261.

[4] In this regard, the Appeals Chamber also recalls that “[t]]he principle of individual guilt requires that an accused can only be convicted for a crime if his mens rea comprises the actus reus of the crime” (Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 66, quoting Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 114). Thus, for a conviction of extermination, not only the actus reus but also the mens rea must encompass the large scale element.

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 30.06.2016 STANIŠIĆ & ŽUPLJANIN
(IT-08-91-A)

1021.  The Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of extermination is “the act of killing on a large scale”.[1] It is this element of “massiveness” that distinguishes the crime of extermination from the crime of murder.[2] However, the expression “on a large scale” does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a minimum number of victims.[3] While extermination as a crime against humanity has been found in relation to the killing of thousands, it has also been found in relation to far fewer killings.[4]

1022.  The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case‑by‑case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred.[5] The Appeals Chamber has found that relevant factors include but are not limited to: (i) the time and place of the killings;[6] (ii) the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted;[7] (iii) the type of victims;[8] (iv) whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity;[9] and (v) the population density of the victims’ area of origin.[10] These factors do not constitute elements of the crime of extermination as a crime against humanity, but rather are factors which a trier of facts may take into account when assessing whether or not the “large scale” element is satisfied.[11] Moreover, separate killing incidents may be aggregated for the purpose of meeting the “large scale requirement” if the killings are considered to be part of one and the same operation.[12] Whether killings are part of the same operation must be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis taking into account the circumstances in which they occurred.[13] As held by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, collective consideration of distinct events committed in different locations, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, over an extended period of time cannot satisfy the requirement of killing on a large scale.[14]

[…]

1027.  […] [T]he Appeals Chamber considers that while a trial chamber may take into consideration the time frame when assessing whether killings are part of the same operation,[15] the jurisprudence does not establish specific time limits as a requirement for extermination.[16] Rather, as set out above, it is the collective consideration of factors, including the time frame, which should be taken into account in determining whether the killings formed part of the same operation and thus whether they may be aggregated.[17] […]

1028.  Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that Župljanin offers no support for his statement that killings may only be aggregated when at least one of the incidents in itself is considered large scale,[18] and it finds no support for this proposition in the Tribunal’s case law.[19] […]

[1] Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536, referring to Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 660. See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 1, para. 44.

[2] Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. See Trial Judgement, vol. 1, para. 44.

[3] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[4] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537. In the Lukić and Lukić case, the Appeals Chamber found that the killing of 59 persons was sufficiently large so as to constitute extermination (Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 543). In the Akayesu case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber upheld the finding that the killing of 16 persons constituted extermination (see Akayesu Appeal Judgement, paras 423-424; Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 737-744).

[5] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538, referring to Martić Trial Judgement, para. 63, Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 640, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 391, Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 57; Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716, Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1061. See Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 472, finding “that the scale of the killings, in light of the circumstances in which they occurred, meets the required threshold of massiveness for the purposes of extermination” (emphasis added).

[6] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538.

[7] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538.

[8] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 542.

[9] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538.

[10] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, paras 539, 542-543.

[11] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 542.

[12] Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.

[13] Cf. Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 149.

[14] Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.

[15] See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 1022.

[16] See Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147, stating that “[i]]t is not required that that the killings be on a vast scale in a concentrated location over a short period of time.” See also Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.

[17] Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396. See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 1022.

[18] See Župljanin Appeal Brief [Stojan [Ž]]upljanin’s Appeal Brief, 19 August 2013 (confidential; public redacted version filed on 23 August 2013, re-filed on 21 April 2016)]], para. 228.

[19] The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Brđanin case, the Trial Chamber found killings occurring in separate incidents between 22 April 1992 and 18 December 1992 to collectively amount to extermination (10 victims at Manjača detention camp, 94 victims at Omarska detention camp, 20 victims at Trnopolje detention camp, 20 victims in the Sanski Most Incident, 4 victims in front of Manjača Camp, 190 victims at Room 3 Keraterm detention camp, 200 victims at Korićanske Stijene, 11 victims at Petar Kočić elementary school, 144 victims at Biljani, 45 victims at Teslić TO). It however did not convict Brđanin for extermination, and this finding was not challenged on appeal (see Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras 436-465, 467, 478-479).

Download full document
ICTR Statute Article 3(b) ICTY Statute Article 5(b)
Notion(s) Filing Case
Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2015 NYIRAMASUHUKO et al. (Butare)
(ICTR-98-42-A)

2123.            The Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.[1] This is what distinguishes the crime of extermination from the crime of murder.[2] The Appeals Chamber further recalls that “large scale” does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a minimum number of victims.[3] The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred.[4] Relevant factors include, inter alia, the time and place of the killings, the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted, and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity.[5]

2124.            There can be no dispute that, “taken by themselves”, the individual killings of the Tutsi girl and Ruvurajabo at the Hotel Ihuliro roadblock in late April 1994 do not meet the “large scale” requirement. The Appeals Chamber, however, is not persuaded that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that these two killings, taken collectively with the other killings for which Ntahobali was convicted, “occurred on a large scale”.

2125.            In the Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber considered that “the Trial Chamber was unreasonable to conclude that the ‘large scale’ requirement for extermination was satisfied based on a collective consideration of events committed in different prefectures, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over a period of two months.”[6] The Appeals Chamber observes that, by contrast, the two killings perpetrated at the Hotel Ihuliro roadblock were perpetrated in the same commune, in similar circumstances, by the same category of perpetrators, and approximately at the same time as the numerous killings perpetrated at the locations near the IRST, at or near the EER, and the killings of Tutsis abducted from the Butare Prefecture Office.[7] For all these events, the Trial Chamber concluded that the victims were all or predominantly of Tutsi ethnicity and were not targeted in their individual capacity but as part of a collective aim to exterminate the Tutsis.[8]

2126.            In the circumstances of this case, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s collective consideration of the events in relation of which Ntahobali was convicted to find him guilty of extermination as a crime against humanity for the killings perpetrated at the Hotel Ihuliro roadblock and all other killings for which he remains convicted. […]

[…]

3910.            It is unclear whether the individual killing of the eight abducted Tutsi women and girls Witness QAR testified about could be considered to meet the “large scale” requirement.[9] In any event, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding that, taken collectively with the killings perpetrated at Mugombwa Church and Kabuye Hill for which Ndayambaje was also convicted, the killing of the group of abducted women and girls “occurred on a large scale”. The Appeals Chamber observes that the killing of the abducted women and girls was perpetrated in the same commune as the Mugombwa Church massacre and not far from the Kabuye Hill attacks,[10] that Ndayambaje similarly encouraged by his presence or his words the assailants to perpetrate the crimes,[11] and that the victims were not targeted in their individual capacity but as part of a collective aim to exterminate the Tutsis.[12] The instant situation therefore differs from the situation addressed in the Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement which Ndayambaje relies upon in support of his contention that the “large scale” requirement was not met regarding the killings of the abducted women and girls.[13]

See also para. 3309.

[1] See, e.g., Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 660; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 394; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[2] See, e.g., Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260, referring to Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.

[3] See, e.g., Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537; Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 185; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. See also Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, fn. 924.

[4] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538 and references cited therein.

[5] Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538 and references cited therein.

[6] Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396. See also Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661.

[7] See supra, Sections V.F, V.G.3, V.G.4, V.I, V.J.

[8] Trial Judgement, paras. 5783, 5784, 5844, 5852, 5854, 5870-5873, 5914, 5915. The Appeals Chamber is mindful that there is no genocidal intent requirement for the crime of extermination as a crime against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s findings with respect to the perpetrators’ and Ntahobali’s genocidal intent are relevant in this case to establish that the killings were directed against Tutsis as a collective group rather than victims in their individual capacities.

[9] Cf. Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537.

[10] See Trial Judgement, paras. 1018, 1398, 5949.

[11] See Trial Judgement, paras. 5754, 5757, 5774, 5955.

[12] Trial Judgement, paras. 5756, 5773, 5954. The Appeals Chamber is mindful that there is no genocidal intent requirement for the crime of extermination as a crime against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s findings with respect to the perpetrators’ and Ndayambaje’s genocidal intent are relevant in this case to establish that the killings were directed against Tutsis as a collective group rather than victims in their individual capacities.

[13] See also supra, para. 2125.

Download full document