|Appeal Judgement - 26.05.2003||
301. An Indictment is aimed at providing the accused with “a description of the charges against him with sufficient particularity to enable him to mount his defence.” Accordingly, the indictment must be sufficiently specific, meaning that it must reasonably inform the accused of the material charges, and their criminal characterisation. The materiality of an alleged fact depends, above all, on the nature of the alleged criminal conduct charged to the accused. Before the ICTY, these principles derive from Articles 17(4), 20(2), 20(4)(a) and (b) of the Statute, and Rule 47(C) of the Rules.
302. Although, a priori, the Prosecution is required to prove the facts alleged in the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber holds the view that the Indictment cannot have the degree of specificity of the evidence underpinning it. The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that, in general, minor differences between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial are not such as to prevent the Trial Chamber from considering the indictment in the light of the evidence presented at trial. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that in Kunarac, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that “minor discrepancies between the dates in the Trial Judgement and those in the Indictment […] go to prove […] that the events charged in the Indictment did not occur.”
303. Such doctrines must, however, be assessed in the light of paragraphs 20(2), (4)(a) and (b) of the Statute, and take into account the specific circumstances of each case. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charge against him and the right to have adequate time for the preparation of his defence imply that an accused must be able to identify the criminal acts and conduct alleged in the indictment in all circumstances. Before holding that an event charged is immaterial or that there are minor discrepancies between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, a Chamber must normally satisfy itself that no prejudice shall, as a result, be caused to the accused. An example of such prejudice is the existence of inaccuracies likely to mislead the accused as to the nature of the charges against him. Depending on the specific circumstances of each case, the question to be to determined is whether an accused was reasonably able to identify the crime and criminal conduct alleged in each of the paragraphs of the Indictment.
306. It is the opinion of the Appeals Chamber that the alleged variance between the evidence presented at trial and the Indictment in relation to the date of the commission of the offence cannot lead to invalidation of the Trial Chamber’s findings unless the said date is actually an essential part of the Appellant’s alleged offence.
401. […] [W]here the Appellant makes serious allegations regarding the integrity of the judicial process, […], he must, inter alia, demonstrate the prejudice caused by the divergences between the facts alleged in the Indictment and the evidence adduced at trial in accordance with the relevant jurisprudence […].
 Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 95; see also para. 88, and the Furundzija Appeal Judgement, para. 61.
 Kupreskic Appeal Judgement, para. 89.
 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 217.
 Non-material facts are, by nature, superfluous; in other words, it is not, in principle, necessary to prove them in order to establish the culpability of an accused for a given crime.
 Moreover, it goes without saying that where an accused considers that the evidence at trial falls outside the scope of the indictment, he may raise an objection as to lack of fair notice and/or seek appropriate remedy from the Trial Chamber, either by way of an adjournment of the proceedings or by excluding the challenged evidence. (Furundzija Appeal Judgement, para. 61).
 See Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158.
 See Part VI: Distribution of Weapons.
|Appeal Judgement - 20.10.2010||
163. The Appeals Chamber considers that a broad date range, in and of itself, does not invalidate a paragraph of an indictment. In light of the Trial Chamber’s finding that abductions were recurring and that Rukundo was involved on “at least four occasions”, and given that the evidence indicates that his involvement in the abductions did essentially span this period, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the date range of April and May 1994 was unreasonably broad. […]
 See, e.g., Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para. 58 (in which the Appeals Chamber found that a paragraph of the indictment which gave a date range of mid-April to June 1994 was not defective).
 Trial Judgement, paras. 364, 570.
|Appeal Judgement - 14.12.2011||
BAGOSORA et al. (Military I)
150. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a broad date range, in and of itself, does not invalidate a paragraph of an indictment. A decisive factor in determining the degree of specificity with which the Prosecution is required to particularise the facts of its case in the indictment is the nature of the alleged criminal conduct with which the accused is charged. Obviously, there may be instances where the sheer scale of the alleged crimes makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as the identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of the crimes.
151. Nonetheless, in the present case, given that the Nyundo Parish attacks occurred during three specific consecutive days at the beginning of April 1994, the Appeals Chamber considers that by pleading a time-frame of almost three months, the Indictment was vague and overly broad with respect to the dates of the attacks. The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that the Indictment was defective in relation to the allegations pertaining to Nyundo Parish. It therefore turns to consider whether this defect in the Indictment was cured.
 Rukundo Appeal Judgement, para. 163.
 Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 25; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 324; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.
 Muvunyi Appeal Judgement of 29 August 2008, para. 58; Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 79, 197; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 89.